In financing the purchase of major durable goods by loans, consumers have to put down a significant down payment. Some consumers who are willing to buy a new car are unable to do so because of their inability to provide a down payment. We develop a model in which a durable goods manufacturer recognizes this problem and gives consumers a cash rebate that consumers can use for the down payment. We derive equilibrium prices, quantities and profits for the manufacturer that sells its product through a retailer. We find among other things, that under certain conditions, the manufacturer with the lower durability product is more likely to give cash rebates. In addition, when such rebates are given, the manufacturer with the lower durability product offer a greater cash rebate. We empirically test some of our equilibrium results using a proprietary data base that includes all the customer cash promotions given by the three U.S. car manufacturers and the four major Japanese manufacturers for the period 1992-1997. We find strong support for our model predictions.
INTRODUCTION
Major durable goods such as automobiles, furniture and home entertainment systems are expensive relative to most consumers' income. Consequently, these purchases are normally financed, 1 requiring the consumer to have enough liquid assets to make a significant down payment (typically in the range of 10-20% of the purchase price). For durables like automobiles where a second hand market exists, the purchasers often want to use the proceeds from their existing (used) car as this liquid asset. This requires the potential customers to have enough equity in the durable to make the down payment. Interestingly, approximately 40% of all car owners are "upside down", i.e., still owe more money on their car than the current market value of the car (USA Today, 2003) . If these consumers want to replace their existing cars with new cars, they not only have to come up with a down payment, but also must pay off the amount they are still upside down. This inability to use the used car for the down payment is often a barrier that stops them from purchasing a new car.
We develop and analyze a model in which a durable goods manufacturer gives cash rebates (often called customer cash by the trade) in order to help consumers solve their liquidity problems, thereby stimulating the new car demand. 2 We chose to study this problem of cash rebates even though numerous prior studies look at retail promotions. We do this for a number of reasons. First, customer rebates in the automobile industry alone represent marketing expenses that exceed $3 billion dollars per year. Second, to the best of our knowledge no one has modeled a situation where a) a manufacturer directly gives a rebate to consumers, b) an independent dealer sets the retail price and c) any increased sales that come from these rebates produces second hand durables that compete with new durable sales. Finally, even though we use the automobile industry as our model for studying this marketing practice, we believe our results can be generalized to other industries that are characterized by similar stylized facts.
Our study is composed of two parts. After briefly reviewing the literature on price promotions, we derive a demand structure for new and used expensive durables distributed through a third party outlet (e.g., a franchised dealer). This demand structure is a function of the quality of the new and used car, the retail prices of the two competing cars as well as size of the customer rebate. We then use this demand structure to solve for equilibrium prices, quantities and profits using a game theoretic model of an industry composed of one durable manufacturer and one franchised dealer. This allows us to derive a series of implications on how profits, prices, and sales vary with some of the parameters of our model. For example, we show that a manufacturer of a lower quality durable is more likely to use cash rebates and give deeper discounts than a higher quality durable manufacturer. We also show that the effective price to consumers raises when manufacturers give customer cash. In the second part of our study, we empirically test some of our equilibrium results using a proprietary data base that includes all the cash rebates promotions given in the United States by the three U.S. car manufacturers and the four major Japanese manufacturers for the period 1992-1997. We find strong support for our model predictions.
We believe this paper makes a number of substantive and theoretical contributions. First, it offers a new explanation for why a manufacturer might want to give a cash rebate directly to a consumer. Specifically we show this pricing action allows the manufacturer to increase sales by shifting the demand function outward instead of sliding down the demand curve. Second, we explicitly allow for the empirical fact that not everyone who is willing to pay for a durable has the ability to pay for this durable. We do this by augment the often used construct "willingnessto pay" with an additional construct: ability-to-pay. We believe this new approach can be applied to numerous durable goods markets. Third, we provide a series of testable hypotheses concerning the profits and prices associated with cash rebates. For example, we show that the margins decrease for both the manufacturer and retailer although both derive increased profits from the rebate. Fourth, we provide empirical evidence that strongly supports three of our major results. We discuss all these issues in more depth after we derive our results.
We start our analysis by noting that cash rebates are given with the idea of increasing demand. Conceptually, this increased demand can either come from the firm sliding down a fixed demand curve, i.e., any increase in the quantity sold comes from a lower effective price after the rebate, or from the firm shifting the demand curve outwards, i.e., the firm gets more sales for any given effective price. In the former case, new consumers enter the market because the effective retail price is lower. In the latter case, they enter the market because receiving cash rebates provides them with value, independent of getting a lower effective retail price.
Determining which of the two ways cash rebates impact demand the most depends on the industry we study. In our case we note that when the auto manufacturer provides customers with a direct cash payment some consumers who otherwise lack the ability to purchase a car now are able to enter the market, thereby shifting the demand curve outward. Specifically, cash rebates allow those customers who have a high valuation for the product but who lack the abilityto-pay because of the stringent down payment terms, now to buy the product even if the effective purchase price remains the same. In addition, unless the retailer determines it is in his best interest to increase the retail price more than the size of the rebate, the effective retail price will decrease, allowing the firm to slide down the demand curve. These stylized facts lead us to postulate a model where consumers are heterogeneous with respect to a) their ability to come up with the necessary down payment and b) their willingness to pay. With this as background, we next review prior work on promotions and then present our model of buyer behavior and derive the appropriate demand functions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a rich literature on price promotions. Blattberg, et al. (1995) provide a number of empirical generalizations concerning the effects of price promotions. However, almost all of these generalizations come from studies of consumer non-durables. One finding that has been replicated numerous times is that temporary retail price reductions substantially increase the sales of the consumer non-durable brand being promoted. This increase in sales also was observed by Pauwels, et al. (2002) for automobiles who report short term (one week) and long term (one to two months) increases in sales associated with unexpected retail price reductions.
Interestingly, the above discussed findings are mixed with respect to the degree to which these increased sales come from other brands (i.e., brand switching) or increases due to category expansion.
Given the large impact of price promotions on brand sales, it is not surprising that a number of researchers have offered explanations for this occurrence. A few of these explanations are based on monopoly models and thus do not require brand switching. Blattberg, required monthly loan payments. et al. (1981) postulate that retailers offer price promotions to reduce their inventory carrying costs by transferring the holding cost to the consumer. Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) expand on this idea by building a model where consumers with higher holding costs also have higher consumption rates. In this case, promotions are given to these high-cost, high-consumption customers to get them to stockpile the promoted brand thereby increasing consumption. Gerstner and Hess (1995) assume two distinct segments of consumers who vary in terms of willingness to pay. They show that a manufacturer who runs pull promotions targeted at price-conscious consumers can help coordinate channels, i.e., reduced the double marginalization problem, by getting the retailer to also target this price conscious segment and therefore lowering his price.
Other researchers formulate models that rely on competition across brands. In marketing, four of the relevant studies are Rao (1991) , Narasimhan (1988) , Lal (1990) and Raju et al. (1990) . All of these models look at price promotions within a non-durable setting. Moreover, they do not reflect the fact that the manufacturer distributes the product through an independent retailer who has control over the retail price. Lal (1990) argues that national brands alternately promote to limit the sales of a store brand. Using a three-brand model, Rao (1991) shows that only national brands (as opposed to store brands) will promote. Narasimhan (1988) shows that in a two-brand market, the depth and frequency of a price promotion is a function of the size of the switcher pool and the switchers' pre-price preference for a particular brand. Raju et al. (1990) assume all the sales increases come at the expense of the competing brand and show that the stronger of the two brands (i.e., the brand with the larger loyalty pool) will promote less.
There is also a large literature on durable goods. However, this literature is primarily focused on addressing the time-consistency problem (see for example, Coase 1972 , Bulow 1982 , Stokey 1981 . A few marketing papers in this stream have looked at channel coordination problems (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; McGuire and Staelin, 1986; Staelin 1994, Purohit (1997) and the relative benefits of leasing and selling Purohit 1998, 1999) .
Only one paper (Bruce, Desai and Staelin, 2003) looks at promotions in a durable industry.
However, in this latter case, the authors model promotions given to the trade (i.e., retailer) and not to the consumer.
In summary, none of these studies deals with issues of consumers' cash constraints. In addition, none of these studies explain why a durable goods manufacturer would give a rebate to consumers in situations where the retailer has direct control of the retail price. Also, none of these studies capture the fact that increased sales have the secondary effect of reducing secondhand durable prices and thus decreasing new durable prices because of the intra-brand competition between the new and used durables. With this in mind, we next develop a model that captures the three key aspects of the situation of interest, i.e., the existence of a completing second hand market, some consumers needing liquid assets to use to make a down payment, and a distribution system that includes an independent retailer who sets the retail price after observing the size of the rebate.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Our interest is in cash rebates and their use in the automobile industry. This leads us to model both the new and secondhand markets and the interaction of these two markets. We acknowledge that the automobile industry is competitive and there are numerous product offerings. However, given our interest in the type of manufacturer that is most likely to use customer rebates and how these rebates affect this manufacturer's profits and prices, we limit the competitive environment to the intra-brand competition between a manufacturer's new and used cars. We discuss this decision later, but the consequence of this assumption is a model of an industry composed of one durable manufacturer and one franchised dealer. The manufacturer chooses the rebate amount (if any) and the wholesale price. The dealer chooses the retail price.
Our model of consumer behavior needs to reflect key aspects of consumer characteristics.
First, we need to recognize that not all consumers have the ability to buy the durable. We do this by assuming consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the amount of liquid assets they have available to make a down payment. Second, we need to allow for consumer heterogeneity with respect to their valuation for the durable, which in turn affects their desire to own the durable. fraction of used car owners has liquidity problems. Consequently these consumers do not have the ability to buy a new car unless they get access to some liquid assets.
We allow for variation in the consumers' willingness-to-pay for new and used cars. . We assume that θ 0 is large enough to insure that the consumers found it best to buy their last car and τ represents the upper limit on value .
2) Consumers are distributed uniformly with respect to the amount of liquid assets available for a down payment. Let the degree to which consumers lack the liquid assets needed to make a down payment vary uniformly from zero to p, where p represents some upper bound on the need for total liquidity.
3) The consumer's ability and valuation are independent of each other. Thus, consumers are uniformly distributed over a rectangle where the horizontal axis represents their valuation and the vertical axis represents their ability to pay (See Figure 1) .
In order to calculate demand we need to divide these consumers into different segments according to their purchase behavior. Since all these consumers currently own a car, they can either sell their old car and buy a new one, or keep the old car. 3 We determine which action each consumer will take by assuming a consumer will take the action that maximizes the individual's utility net of price. Let p n be the retail price of the new car and R be the size of the cash rebate given to buyers of a new car. Finally, let the used car price be p u. Then for consumer i who currently owns a car, the utility associated with the strategy of selling the old car and buying a new one is:
where the superscript refers to the segment of current car owners. Similarly, the utility for keeping the existing car is
Two aspects of Equations 1 and 2 are of special interest. First the person specific parameter i θ impacts the degree to which the individual values the intrinsic value of the durable.
Thus individuals with large values of i
θ derive more utility after purchasing the car for a given price than those with small values of i θ . Second, we want our model to reflect the two effects of the rebate, R. First, it needs to lower the effective price of the new car before trade in, i.e., from p n to (p n -R). Second, as R increases, we want more individuals enter the market since they are now able to use the available cash rebate to make the down payment. We capture this second effect by assuming that as R increases so does the proportion of buyers who are able to buy a new car. We operationalize this as follows. Let f (R) be a weakly concave function, represents the percentage of these consumers who now can meet the liquidity constraint because of the rebate.
We first determine how many consumers who have the ability to buy a new car find it better to buy a new car versus keeping their existing car. We do this by equating Equations 1 and 2 and solving for θ i . This yields the following (3)
Then consumers with 1 i θ θ > find it best to buy a new car and those with θ values less than θ 1 finding it best to keep their old car (see Figure 2) . Thus, all else equal, increases in R (i.e., the cash rebate) will decrease θ 1, i.e., shift it to the left, thereby increasing the number of new car buyers. Of course, not all else will be equal since both the optimal value for retail price p n and the market clearing used car price p u could change with R, i.e., the retailer could react by increasing p n and the increased supply of used cars due to the increased sale of new cars could decrease p u . Both effects shift θ 1 to the right, thereby reducing the number of new car buyers.
We next look at consumers who do not currently own a useable car. (Conceptually these consumers are entering the market for the first time, own an old car that has fully deteriorated, etc.). We assume the following for this segment. 2) All consumers have the ability to make the down payment. 
where the u and I subscripts represent buying a used car and remaining inactive respectively and the superscript 2 denotes the consumer segment that does not own a useable car at the start of the period.
Equating Equations 4 and 5 yields the indifference point between the group that buys a new car and the group that buys a used car. Interestingly, this indifference point is equal to θ 1, i.e., the same as the one for the segment owning a car. Equating Equations 5 and 6 yield the indifference point between buying a used car and remaining inactive. This latter indifference point, which we denote as θ 2 , is equal to Figure 2) .
We now have enough information to write out the demand for new cars and the supply and demand for used cars. The demand for new cars comes from three different customer groups. We quantify this as follows. The number of customers who currently own car and have the ability and willingness to buy a new car at prices p n and p u before any rebate is α (c 0 ) (τ-θ 1 ).
The number of customers who are given the ability to buy because of the rebate is α(1-c 0 )f(R).
After accounting for willingness, the demand for this group is α (1-c 0 ) f(R)(τ-θ 1 ). Finally, the demand for new cars from the consumers in the segment which starts out without useable cars is
(1-α) (τ-θ 1 ). Combining these three groups of customers yields
is our derived demand curve and thus is one of the underlying drivers of our results.
We note that the size of the rebate has two different effects. Increases in R increase S (since f( R ) is assumed to be an increasing function in R) as well as T (assuming u p remains fixed).
Thus the term S T shifts the demand function outward while the term S b makes the demand function steeper in own price, n p .
We acknowledge that used car prices are endogenous and thus are a function of the exogenous actions of our model and of our model parameters. We derive these prices by equating the supply and demand of used cars. The supply of used cars comes directly from the segment of size α of previous car owners who trade in their cars to buy a new car, i.e.,
The demand for used cars can be determined from the segment of size (1-α) of consumers who now don't own a useable car and find it best to buy a used car, i.e., ). )( (
Equating Equations 8 and 9 and substituting for θ 1 and θ 2 yields used car prices as a function of new car prices and the cash rebate as well as our four model parameters, α, c 0 , τ , and γ. We then substitute this used car price equation into Equation 7 yielding:
Substituting Equation 10 into 7, we get new car demand after taking into account the endogenous used car prices, i.e.,
Before using Equation 11 to derive equilibrium prices and quantities, we briefly summarize our approach. We want to reflect the fact that the cash rebate increases the pool of available buyers. However, we also want to capture the fact that this increase is not costless.
Specifically, increasing the sale of new cars also increases the supply of used cars and thus, lowers the price of these cars. Since used cars compete with the sale of new cars, it is possible that there exists some upper bound on how much of a cash rebate the manufacturer would want to give. Our development yields a demand function which is directly linked to these two opposing forces, i.e., expanding the pool of potential buyers and lowering used car prices. The net result is a demand structure where the slope and intercept are a complicated function of our four model parameters.
ANALYSIS
We make the usual assumption that the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, setting both the wholesale price and the size of the per car cash rebate given to the consumers who buy their new car, after taking into account the profit maximizing actions of the dealer. The dealer takes as given the wholesale price and the size of the rebate and sets a retail price so as to maximize his retail profit. The retailer's profit function is then
, where n w is the manufacturer's wholesale price for new cars. In calculating manufacturer profit we assume the only marginal costs for the manufacturers are the customer rebate, i.e., R, and the administrative costs associated with the rebate. We define the latter to be k R where k>0. Thus, the manufacturer's profit function is
. Using the demand function stated in Equation 11 and the rules of the game stated above we are able to determine retail and wholesale prices, the magnitude of the cash rebate given and manufacturer and retailer profits.
The results are given in Table 1 .
Key Results
We first examine if the manufacturer finds it optimal to offer cash rebates. Our underlying model has cash rebates expanding demand by shifting the demand function outward as well as sliding down the demand curve via an effective lower price. Equation 7 makes it clear that the shift outward occurs only if α > 0 and c 0 <1. Consequently, it is not surprising that Lemma 1 indicates that the manufacturer does not always find it profitable to give customer rebates i.e., : Specifically we find the manufacturer offers a cash rebate only when
From this condition, it is clear that when the cost of offering promotions, k, is low, the fraction of upside-down consumers ( 0 c 1 − ) is high, and the effectiveness of the rebate in solving the upsideproblem, as represented by f'(R), is high, the manufacturer is more likely to offer the cash rebates.
We next explore what happens to prices, quantities and profits when the manufacturer offers a rebate. We note that the rebate allows some upside down consumers to replace their used cars with new cars, potentially increasing new car sales. However, this influx of high valuation customers into the market has two effects that could temper this sales increase. First, retailers may react to the outward shift of the demand curve and increase retail prices. Second, any increase in the supply of used cars will result in a decrease in used car prices, thereby, increasing the competition between the two substitutable products. Manufacturers influence all this via their wholesale price and the size of the rebate.
The net result of this complex interact is as follows. Propositions 1 and 2 provide a detailed description of each agent's actions. Two factors lead the retailer to increase its price. First, the manufacturer's rebate reduces the effective retail price for consumers. The retailer takes advantage of this by increasing his retail price. Second, the manufacturer, sensing the shifting demand curve and the increased marginal costs associated with the rebate, increases its wholesale price, thereby driving up the retailer's marginal cost. The net result is that the retailer's margins decrease even though the effective retail price exceeds the price without rebate. However, since the quantity sold also increases with the rebate, the net result is that the retailer's profits increase.
The rebate has mixed impact on consumers. Upside-down consumers are better off with the rebate because their liquidity constraints are relaxed and thus they can now buy a new car thereby increasing their net utility. However, all the other consumers who could have bought a new car without the rebate are worse off. Some of these consumers buy the new car but end up paying a higher price even after receiving the rebate. Others do not buy a new car, but instead either keep their used car or buy a used car. Thus, as with many marketing actions, there are "winners" and "losers".
Finally, we note the counter balancing effects of higher effective retail price and the shifting outward of the demand function. The higher effective price causes some of the liquid consumers to not buy a new car, thereby shifting the identity of the marginal new (and thus used) car buyer to the right toward 1 (see Figure 2) . On the other hand, the rebate allows some nonliquid consumers to buy a new car, thereby increasing the stock of used cars that need to be sold.
This has the opposite effect, i.e., it shifts θ 2 farther to the left of 2 Θ in Figure 2 .
We next study how the durability of the car, γ, affects the manufacturer's cash rebates decisions. As we discussed in the model section, the durability of the car represents how well the car holds up with usage. We previously made the realistic assumption that ) ( ) (
the value of a new car (for a fixed level of durability) is greater than or equal to the used car value. Moreover by definition the valuations are equal only when γ =1, i.e., the car is so durable that it does not deteriorate. These assumptions are compatible with the assumption that 
We note that (C1) is a sufficient condition for our proofs and is stronger than a necessary condition. In other words, our following results may hold even when this condition is not satisfied. However, for the remainder of this section, we assume that the condition in C1 holds.
Using C1, we show the following two Propositions. effective. Said less technically, since the low durability manufacturer does not experience as much competition from its used car as does the high durability firm, it is able to get a bigger bang for its buck..
We noted earlier that the condition in (C1) is a strong sufficient condition. We say this because it is easy to find parameters for which our results are valid even when this condition doesn't hold. Consequently in the next section we empirically test Propositions 3 and 4 to ascertain its external validity. In order to do so, we need to reconcile the fact that our model assumes the firm gives a rebate throughout the period, yet empirically firms seem to periodically give rebates. Other models (e.g., Lal, (1990), Rao (1991) , etc.) address this issue by allowing the firm to use a mixed strategy, i.e., promote only with some probability. Our approach is somewhat different, but still captures the spirit of periodic rebates. Our model assumes the manufacturer determines the proportion of non-liquid consumers it wants to make liquid via the cash rebate. We capture this proportion via our parameter f(R), i.e., as R increases so does this proportion. We suspect there exists some psychological threshold in terms of the size of the rebate that will be noticed by consumers in order to generate some response. For example, we suspect a constant offer of a $75 cash rebate for a $20,000 car would not attract much attention.
However, an offer of $865 (=75*12) for one month out of a 12 month period would be noticed.
Moreover, it would yield the 'same' effect as predicted by our model assuming the response is linear since under this linear assumption one month at $865 is equivalent to 12 months at $75. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our theory offers several testable hypotheses. In this section, we test three as well as one of our underlying assumptions. The three hypotheses are as follows:
H1: The probability that consumer promotions are given decreases with the durability of the product.
H2:
The depth of a consumer promotion, averaged over the model year, is higher for products with lower durability.
H3:
The retail price of the new car increases with the depth of the consumer promotion and the durability of the car.
Hypothesis H1 comes directly from Proposition 3. H2 comes from Proposition 4 and our interpretation that it is equivalent for a firm to promote $x for the period of analysis or $nx for 1/nth of the period. H3 comes from Proposition 1 and Result 1. car. This is important because empirically Japanese nameplates have, on average, higher predicted durability than the domestic nameplates. By including the foreign dummy along with our durability measure we are able to control for other factors associated with the foreign cars such as management policy, that might serve as an alternate explanation.
Data Description and Measures

Empirical model
We jointly test H1 and H2 by specifying and simultaneously estimating a two-equation system that models an automobile manufacturer's decision to offer a consumer rebate and conditional on offering a rebate, the size (depth) of the promotion. Formally, we investigate H1
and H2 together using a random effects variant of the widely applied sample selection model.
(See for example , Verbeek 1990; Zabel 1992; Veerbeek and Nijman, 1992) .
We model the decision to offer a consumer deal with a random effects Probit. More specifically, we define z it * to be the latent propensity of an automobile manufacturer to promote nameplate i (Toyota Camry, Ford Escort, etc) . We allow the disturbance components, ε it and u i to be correlated via the parameter ρ. Thus, the estimable parameters in our model are the slope and intercept parameters contained in vectors β and λ, the variance parameters σ ε , σ α and σ η and the correlation parameter, ρ. (We make the non-restrictive assumption that σ u =1 to insure the system is identified.) Lastly, we make the standard, but somewhat restrictive assumption that the observations on different nameplates are independent even though some of the nameplates in our data are marketed by the same automobile manufacturer. Mathematically,
and y it , x it observed if and only if z it = 1,
( )
We obtain estimates of our model parameters by maximizing the theoretical unconditional likelihood of the i th nameplate. We derive this likelihood function by first stating the contribution of the i th nameplate in year t to the likelihood conditional on the unobserved random effects. We then integrate out these unobserved variables. This conditional likelihood is comprised of three expressions, the conditional probability that a firm offers a consumer deal, the distribution of the consumer depth and the probability the firm does not offer a consumer deal.
Thus the theoretical unconditional likelihood of the ith nameplate is
T is the number of years of data. We estimate the parameters using the maximum simulated likelihood routine found in LIMDEP 8.0.
We test H3 using another system of equations. From H2 we hypothesize that 1 a will be negative, while H3 implies that 2 b will be positive.
Conventional logic states that 1 b should also be positive. We estimate this system of equations using three stage least squares. 7
Results
The results of our analysis pertaining to H1 and H2 along with the list of the explanatory variables used in our analysis are provided in Table 2 . As predicted, the durability coefficient in both the promotion and depth equations is statistically significant and negative; that is, the likelihood of consumer promotion decreases with durability (H1) and the average depth of consumer promotion decreases with durability (H2). In addition, the coefficient on product differentiation is negative and significant in the promotion likelihood equation, suggesting that consumer promotions are more likely to occur when markets are more competitive, i.e., less differentiated. Note, however, that product differentiation does not affect the average depth of the consumer promotion.
The foreign car indicator is insignificant in both equations. We previously noted that the American nameplates on average have a lower durability level than the Japanese nameplates.
However, by including the foreign car indicator, we are able to rule out the possibility that our durability results are due entirely to differences in the management practices of the Japanese and American carmakers. Said more directly, we find the hypothesized durability effects even after controlling for any differences in managerial practices. 8 This provides us with more confidence concerning our assertion that lower durability causes manufacturers to use consumer promotions and give deeper average promotions.
Another possible explanation for cash rebates is that these promotions are a way to manage inventory levels. Our Table 2 results provide some support for this belief, at least in terms of the likelihood that a firm offers a consumer promotion during the 16 months period.
However, we find no impact of excess inventory levels on the depth of the promotion.
We further explore the impact of inventory levels on consumer promotions by looking at the frequency of consumer promotions by month over the 16 months associated with a given model year by aggregating the data across models and model years. Our analytic model assumes consumer promotions are offered throughout the period in order to solve consumers' upside down problem. In contrast, the hypothesis that consumer promotions are used to clear inventories should show a different pattern since excess inventories historically exist at the end of the model year.
The results of our analysis for domestic and foreign nameplates are shown in Tables 3   and 4 . There are several important observations. First, consumer promotions are given throughout the total model year. However, promotion frequency for foreign manufacturers is somewhat stronger in the latter part of the model year. We infer from this that inventory management may play a greater role in foreign firms' decisions to offer consumer promotions. This is compatible with the observation that their supply chain is longer (i.e., most Japanese cars are shipped from Japan). In summary, although firms are more likely to use consumer promotions if there exists some inventory imbalance (especially among foreign nameplates), we find strong evidence that these promotions are used throughout the model year. This, in turn, supports our underlying model assumption and thus our Table 2 results.
We find the highly significant negative estimate of ρ to be interesting. It suggests that when consumer promotions are given for causes not included in our model (and thus by assumption these causes are random), the resulting promotion has a smaller average depth.
Although we have little evidence on why this occurs, this observation has strong face validity. In other words, if a firm gives a promotion for some unplanned reason, the average consumer depth will be lower than those consumer promotions that are planned.
The results of our test of H3 are found in Table 5 along with a list of control variables.
As can be seen from these results, the coefficients for durability and deal depth are positive and significant even after adjusting for car type. Thus, compatible with Proposition 1, we find our proxy for dealers' retail price increases when the manufacturer gives deeper consumer rebates.
Moreover, this finding occurs even after controlling durability and the type of car being sold. As predicted from H2 and Result 1 , we find (again) that durability has a negative and significant effect on deal depth and a positive effect on retail price. We find these results encouraging, since they provide one more test of our model predictions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The overarching goal of this paper is to explain why durable manufacturers might want to
give rebates directly to consumers even when they cannot set the retail price. We do this by developing a model that reflects the fact that the viability of this pricing action depends on being able to shift the demand curve outward (versus sliding down the demand curve). This led us to relax the standard assumption that consumers always have the ability to pay for a product and thus only consumers' willingness-to-pay for a product matters. We note that at least in the automobile industry, a significant percentage of the population lacks the liquidity to make the required down payment, i.e., lacks the ability to pay.
Our model makes an explicit link between the amount of cash rebate given (which can be used for the down payment) and the number of customers who will ultimately be able to buy. It also reflects the fact that new and used cars are partial substitutes. Thus, increases in new car sales to current owners result in an increased supply of used cars and ultimately lower used car prices. Since used cars are partial substitutes for new cars, the lower used car prices put a downward pressure on new car prices.
We show that there are situations where manufacturers find it profitable to provide the consumer with a cash rebate and the incidence of these situations increases for low durability manufacturers, i.e., manufacturers whose car deteriorates faster than average. Moreover, the depth of these promotions is larger for these lower durability manufacturers. We also show that retail prices increase with the deal depth. We test these three findings using a large data set of customer promotions given over the years 1992-1997. We find strong support for all three of our model predictions. We note that our analytic model makes a number of other predicts. Three of the most interesting are that retail and wholesale margins decrease with the rebate, retail profits increase when the rebates are given and the effective price paid by consumers increases with the rebate.
We note in passing that another way for the manufacturer to address the liquidity problem is by giving a discount to the trade and then relying on the dealer to pass this promotion on to the consumer. Such a procedure, however, is much less effective for two reasons. First, it is well known that the dealer will not pass on all of the promotion to the consumer. Second, although consumers see a decrease in retail price, this decrease does not materially lower the down payment requirements associated with buying a new car. Consequently trade promotions are a very ineffective mechanism for solving consumers' liquidity problem and therefore shifting the demand function outward.
We also note that our model makes a few limiting assumptions. First, it is a one period model, and thus, does not reflect the possible interplay between giving cash rebates and the proportion of customers who may be unable to pay. One of the major reasons why customers become upside down is that their car depreciates faster than the customer makes monthly payments. We find cash rebates lead to lower used car prices, i.e., causes the car to depreciate (but not deteriorate) faster. This implies a linkage between the rebate size, R, and the proportion of consumers who are upside down, 0 c , something not reflected in our model. We believe including this linkage would just increase the frequency of subsequent promotions. However, it
should not alter our results qualitatively.
A second possible limitation is our decision not to model inter-brand competition.
However, we again believe this decision should not affect the qualitative aspects of our conclusions. Assuming the competing durables being studied are only partial substitutes, there still should be a segment that finds each manufacturer's brand most desirable. Consequently, each manufacturer would still want to solve the liquidity problem for its set of buyers. We noted in our empirical analyses that firms in a more competitive environment were more likely to give rebates, but not offer deeper rebates. Perhaps this reflects the firm's attempt to impede defection of its customer base to a competitor who is offering cash rebate (versus helping out a subset of their current owners who otherwise couldn't make the down payment).
We also acknowledge that our results are driven in large part by our (unverified) assumption that used car valuation is a faster increasing function than new car valuation.
Although we provide no empirical evidence to support this assumption, we feel justified in making such an assumption since it is consistent with the concepts that a) new car valuation (for a fixed level of durability) is greater than used car valuation and b) the two valuations are equal only when the new car never deteriorates, i.e., γ approaches its upper limit.
Finally, we reemphasize our belief that the practice of providing customer rebates has less to do with adjusting inventory levels or lowering the effective retail price and more to do with the general liquidity of the current market place. Thus, if all consumers have the ability to pay, we would not expect durable manufacturers to offer customer rebates. (They might, however, offer promotions through the trade.) Likewise, if the percentage of customers who are upside down rises, we would expect the incidence of rebate to increase. This linkage to the proportion of customer's who are unable to pay implies that we would only see gradual changes over time in rebate rates and depth. This observation is consistent with our data. Table 1 Equilibrium Values 
Proof of Lemma 1:
After substituting for * u p , the new car demand function is given by: 
The first-order condition for n w is:
Similarly, the first-order condition for rebate, R, evaluated at the optimal wholesale * n w price is: 
Proof of Proposition 1
We denote the case when the manufacturer does not offer a rebate with the superscript * ψ is more likely to be negative and thus R * is less likely to be positive.
Proof of Proposition 4
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, after substituting for 
